guarantees and derivatives, each with different theoretically-driven weights. As shown below, LC beats measures of bank assets in "horse races" predicting real economic output, and the driving force is off-balance sheet LC , which is not included in the asset measures.
LC is one of the most important roles that banks play and its components are theoretically linked to the economy. Bank loans, particularly those to bank-dependent customers without capital market opportunities, are often thought to be primary engines of economic growth (e.g., Smith, 1776; Levine and Zervos, 1998 ) . These loans also play an important role in affecting output through the bank lending channel of monetary policy (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder, 1998 ) , particularly for small banks that tend to cater to small, bank-dependent firms ( Kashyap and Stein, 20 0 0; . Transactions deposits, another key component of LC, provide liquidity and payments services which are essential to a well-functioning economy ( Kashyap et al., 2002 ) . Off-balance sheet guarantees like loan commitments and standby letters of credit allow customers to expand their economic activities because they are able to plan their investments and other expenditures, knowing that the funds to finance these expenditures will be forthcoming in the future when needed (e.g., Boot et al., 1993 ) . Moreover, these guarantees are often used as backups for other capital market financing, such as commercial paper and municipal revenue bonds, and in this way assist the capital markets in financing http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.04.005 0378-4266/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. economic growth. Similarly, derivatives, the other main type of bank off-balance sheet activity, aid real economic activity by allowing firms to hedge risks related to future changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and other market prices (e.g., Stulz, 2003 ) .
Despite the theoretical links between LC and the economy, the empirical literature until now is missing comprehensive tests of whether LC affects real economic output, measurement of how large such an effect may be, the extent to which the effect derives from small versus large banks and from on-or off-balance sheet activities, and whether this effect is stronger than that of more traditional measures of bank output, total assets ( TA ) or gross total assets ( GTA ), discussed further below. 1 Note that this study is distinguished from studies that examine the determinants of LC (e.g., Jiang et al., 2016 ) and the effects of LC on bank failure (e.g., Fungacova et al., 2015 ) . Our work is also related to the research noted above that links banks to real output (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998 ) . However, this literature has not focused on LC , which includes different weights on all of the bank assets, and also includes liabilities and off-balance sheet activities.
The goal of this paper is to fill these gaps in the literature. Specifically, we test if real economic output is higher in U.S. states in which LC is relatively high after controlling for other determinants of real output. In addition, we measure how large this effect of LC on real economic output is. We also test whether LC is better than the asset measures TA and GTA in predicting real economic output. In addition, we distinguish between small-bank and large-bank LC and between on-and off-balance sheet LC . Finally, we hypothesize that the primary transmission mechanism through which LC impacts GDP is through bank-dependent industries. Our results support this view.
Until recently, LC was mostly relegated to a theoretical concept and was not often used in empirical studies. provide the first comprehensive measure of LC that takes into account the contributions of all bank assets, liabilities, equity, and off-balance sheet activities. To summarize briefly, measured LC is the weighted sum of all assets, liabilities, equity, and off-balance sheet activities, where the weights are based on the liquidity and the location on or off of the balance sheet of each item. Since liquidity is created when banks transform illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, positive weights are given to both illiquid assets and liquid liabilities (e.g., Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 ) . Banks in this situation are taking something illiquid from the public and giving it something liquid. Similarly, negative weights are given to liquid assets, illiquid liabilities, and equity because banks destroy liquidity when they transform liquid assets into illiquid liabilities or equity. In these cases, banks are taking something liquid from the public and giving it something illiquid. Off-balance sheet activities are assigned weights consistent with those assigned to functionally similar on-balance sheet activities. For example, unused loan commitments are assigned a positive weight because they provide liquidity to the public similar to that of transactions deposits (e.g., Boot et al., 1993; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998; Kashyap et al., 2002 ) . See for more details.
LC is also a measure of the output of a bank. According to the modern theory of financial intermediation, banks' two major roles in the economy are liquidity creation and risk transformation. According to the risk transformation theories, banks transform risk by issuing riskless deposits to finance risky loans (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986 ) . 1 We acknowledge the contribution of Fidrmuc, Fungacova, and Weill (2015) , which examines the effects of on-balance sheet LC on real economic output. However, it does not consider off-balance sheet LC (which we find to be most important), or the effects of small versus large banks. It also focuses on Russia, where many of the banks are state-owned, and may have very different economic objectives.
While LC is only one of the two major functions of a bank, the two roles often coincide, given that both riskless deposits and risky loans contribute positively to LC . It is therefore expected that the output of LC is highly correlated with the output of risk transformation. Since there is not as yet any empirical measure of risk transformation, LC may be viewed as the best available measure of total bank output.
The vast majority of empirical studies in banking use one of two measures of bank assets, total assets ( TA ) or gross total assets ( GTA ), as their main measure of bank output. GTA equals TA plus allowances for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve. GTA may be considered to be a superior measure of the size of the balance sheet to TA because GTA includes all of the items that are part of the balance sheet that must be financed. The empirical research includes studies of the effects of bank output or size on corporate governance (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009 ) , small business lending (e.g., Berger et al., 2005 ) , the effects of government interventions and bailouts (e.g., Duchin and Sosyura, 2014 ) , and many other topics. The measures of bank assets are also used as a size cutoff to determine which banks are classified as community banks (e.g., DeYoung et al., 2004 ) , and which banks are subject to different regulatory treatment, such as extra supervision as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), stress tests, and consumer protections. 2 We argue that LC is a superior measure of bank output to TA or GTA because LC takes into account off-balance sheet guarantees and derivatives, deposits and other liabilities, and equity in addition to assets, and because it weights various asset categories differently. As noted above, off-balance sheet guarantees allow customers to expand their economic activities by helping them plan expenditures and are often used as backups for other capital market financing. Similarly, off-balance sheet derivatives allow customers to engage in economic activities without facing significant price risks. TA and GTA do not include off-balance sheet activities. Off-balance sheet activities make up about half of all LC in the U.S. ( Berger and Bouwman, 2016 ) , so neglecting off-balance sheet activities fails to take into account a major part of bank output. By including transactions deposits with positive weights, LC also helps capture the value to the economy of both the liquidity provided by these deposits and the payments services associated with them. Deposits are not included in the asset measures. Another potentially important difference is that TA and GTA both weight all assets equally and positively, whereas LC applies positive, negative, and zero weights to different assets. To illustrate, marketable securities held by a bank increase measured bank output when TA or GTA are used, but they decrease measured output when LC is used. We argue that the negative weight is more appropriate, since holding such securities takes something liquid away from the public and provides no direct benefit to bank customers. 3 As a result of all of these differences, we expect that LC to be more strongly related to economic output than TA or GTA .
As indicated above, we test if real economic output is higher in states in which LC is relatively high, measure the size of this effect, and test whether LC dominates TA and GTA in predicting real economic output. We specifically regress GDP per capita on LC per capita , both measured in real 2010 dollars, in all 50 U.S. states annually from 1984 to 2010, controlling for a number of state conditioning variables, as well as state and year fixed effects. We normalize both GDP and LC by state population because oth-erwise the results would be driven primarily by the large states, as large states mechanically have higher GDP . We also regress industry-level GDP per capita on LC per capita , and test whether the mechanism is through bank-dependent industries.
By way of preview, we find that LC per capita is positively related to GDP per capita , and that these results are both statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in LC per capita is related to a 2.57% increase in GDP per capita . This relation holds in both OLS and instrumental variable estimations, and is robust to many robustness checks. Moreover, we find that when TA per capita or GTA per capita are included in the regressions, LC per capita remains statistically and economically significant, while these alternative measures of bank output are not significant.
When splitting bank LC by size class, we find positive, significant effects on GDP per capita for both small and large bank LC per capita , although small bank LC matters more per dollar, where small banks are measured as those with less than or equal to $1 billion in GTA. The greater effect per dollar of small bank LC per capita is consistent with the literature suggesting that small banks often provide financial services to small businesses that cannot be replicated by capital markets, while large banks more often serve large companies that have outside capital market alternatives, making the large bank LC per capita less important (e.g., Berger et al., 2005 ) . 4 Importantly, despite the per-dollar results, large-bank LC matters more to the economy than small-bank LC because large banks provide so much more liquidity than small banks. To illustrate, for the last year of our sample, 2010, large bank LC was $13.85 trillion, more than seven times the quantity of $1.80 trillion for small banks.
In addition, we find that off-balance sheet LC per capita matters more to GDP per capita than on-balance sheet LC per capita . This may help explain why LC per capita is significantly related to GDP per capita , whereas TA per capita and GTA per capita are not when they are included in the same regressions -TA per capita and GTA per capita exclude off-balance sheet activities. This result is consistent with , who find that detrended off-balance sheet LC is more important than detrended on-balance sheet LC for predicting future financial crises. In contrast, Chatterjee (2015) shows that on-balance sheet LC predicts future recessions. Thus, the relative importance of onand off-balance sheet LC is an unsettled issue. When the results are broken down by both bank size class and on-versus off-balance sheet LC together, the data suggest that on-balance sheet LC matters more for small banks and off-balance sheet LC matters more for large banks. This result stems from the fact that small banks tend to specialize in on-balance sheet activities (including providing relationship-based loans to bank-dependent small businesses) and have relatively few off-balance sheet activities. In contrast, large banks more often provide transaction loans to large businesses that have alternative external financing options, and generate most of their LC off the balance sheet. Thus, while LC by both sizes of banks contribute significantly to economic growth, the primary mechanism behind these results differ -on-balance sheet LC by small banks and off-balance sheet LC by large banks. The reason why off-balance sheet LC dominates overall when both small and large banks are included is that large banks provide so much more LC in aggregate than small banks, as shown above.
We also investigate whether and how the effects of LC vary during normal times and financial crises and find mixed resultsthe effects of LC per capita on GDP per capita are stronger than in 4 Small businesses are often thought of as the engine of economic growth in the United States. Small business accounted for 63% of net new jobs between 1993 and 2013 and comprise 99.7% of U.S. employer firms ( Small Business Administration, 2014 ). normal times during some crises and weaker during other crises. In addition, we investigate the dynamics of the relation between LC per capita and GDP per capita , and find the effects of LC per capita are strongest in the first year. We also conduct a number of robustness checks that support our main results.
Finally, we analyze the relation between state-level LC per capita and state-industry-level GDP per capita. This allows us to test our hypothesized transmission mechanism -that LC affects GDP primarily through its effect on bank-dependent industries. We find that the relation is positive for nearly all industries, and statistically and economically significant in industries considered to be more bank-dependent, consistent with the hypothesized transmission mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 presents the main results of the effects of state LC per capita on state GDP per capita , some robustness checks, analyses by bank size class, and instrumental variable estimation. Section 4 investigates the effects during financial crises versus normal times, probes the dynamics of the relation between LC and real economic output, and presents some additional robustness tests. Section 5 examines our results on a state-industry level. Section 6 concludes by providing a summary of the results, policy implications, and suggestions for future research. Table 1 Panel A reports the definitions and sources for the variables used in the analysis, Panel B shows summary statistics for these variables, and Panel C gives a correlation matrix for the main dependent and independent variables. The sample consists of annual state level observations over 1984-2010. The dependent variable is GDP per capita . We collect GDP by state from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and normalize this variable by the state's population in each year using annual US Census intercensal population estimates. We normalize by population so that our results are not driven by the largest states. Over the course of the sample, the average state GDP per capita was $39,089.95. All financial variables are calculated in real 2010 dollars throughout the analysis. 5 Our key independent variable is LC per capita . We use preferred CATFAT liquidity creation measure. These data are available on the bank level at a quarterly frequency. 6 In order to match the frequency of reporting of GDP data, we calculate all LC measures at the annual frequency. We calculate the annual average CATFAT for each bank for each sample year and convert these data to the state level. For some of the analyses, we also compute LC for small and large banks. We additionally compute on-balance sheet LC and off-balance sheet LC . On-balance sheet LC data is computed as CATNONFAT measure, and off-balance sheet LC is calculated as the difference between CATFAT and CATNONFAT.
Data
Most banks operate solely in one state. In these cases, we simply include the bank's LC in the state's total. For multistate banks, we assume that LC is geographically distributed according to the deposits of the bank, taken from the FDIC's Summary of Deposits (SoD) database, which reports the amount of deposits held in each office of each bank in the U.S. This assumption is necessary because deposits is the only balance sheet variable we can use to determine location, although we recognize that this creates measurement error, since LC reflects more outputs than just deposits. This measurement error creates an attenuation bias against finding any 5 We use annual data despite the fact that the LC data are available quarterly. This is because quarterly GDP per capita data on the state level only goes back to 2005 at the BEA. Restricting ourselves to this small subsample would severely erode our sample size and ability to draw meaningful inferences over a long time period.
6 These data are available at: https://sites.google.com/a/tamu.edu/bouwman/data . Total bank book equity in the state for banks with greater than $1 billion in gross total assets, normalized by the state's population.
Call Report Data
Bank Equity per capita -Small (Thousands, $/capita) Total bank book equity in the state for banks with less than or equal to $1 billion in gross total assets, normalized by the state's population.
Rice-Strahan Index ( RSI ) Index that represents the level of interstate branching restrictions for a given state and year. The values range from 0 (least restrictive) to 4 (most restrictive) Rice and Strahan (2010) ( continued on next page ) effect of LC per capita on GDP per capita . In a robustness check, we find that the results are robust to including single-state banks only. We also adjust the data to account for a reporting anomaly in the SoD dataset. Some banks wish to take advantage of relaxed banking regulations in Delaware and South Dakota. As such, they list more deposits in these two states than their actual holdings in these states. To account for this, we make two adjustments. First, we eliminate banks in these two states which report 100% of their deposits in one banking office within the state but do not report their headquarters in the same state. Second, we winsorize the data by year at the 5% level to control for extreme values. Within our sample, the mean value of LC per capita is $12.01, with a standard deviation of $9.47. As noted below, our results are also robust to the exclusion of data from Delaware and South Dakota. Fig. 1 displays the time series of total GDP and LC at the national level over the sample period. We report total GDP and total LC here, rather than normalizing by population, so as to not underweight states with larger populations. 7 Generally, we find that the two variables move together, declining only during the recent subprime financial crisis of the late 20 0 0s. This figure provides us with a very preliminary indication that bank LC is related to economic output.
The correlations shown in Table 1 Panel C confirm the positive relation between the state GDP and LC , both normalized by population. GDP per capita and LC per capita have a very strong 0.365 correlation. The relation is stronger for Large Bank LC per capita than Small Bank LC per capita and stronger for Off-balance sheet LC per capita than On-balance sheet LC per capita . Of course, these correlations only give a general idea of the bivariate relations and account for only one determinant at a time, and do not control for other factors in a rigorous fashion as occurs in our regression analyses below.
We collect several additional bank-level variables. We collect TA and GTA from annual Call Reports, and test them as alternatives to LC as generators of state GDP . We also collect Bank Equity for all banks and for small and large banks separately from the Call Reports to instrument for LC and small bank LC and large bank LC , respectively. We convert each of these variables from the bank level variable to the state level, following the same procedure used for LC . Following this, all of these variables are normalized by state population and winsorized at the 5% level.
Finally We also calculate Regional GDP per capita for each state and year to further control for economic conditions. Regional GDP is calculated by summing the GDP of all states sharing a border with a given state. We then divide this total by the combined populations of all bordering states. 9 Over our sample, the average Regional GDP per capita is $39,806.31, close to the average state level GDP per capita . 10 In our main specifications, we also include Time Fixed Effects to control for changes in the aggregate banking environment. In alternative specifications, we drop Time Fixed Effects and instead include the Federal Funds Rate and the TED Spread , which control for the aggregate banking environment in an alternative way. The Federal Funds Rate is the interest rate at which banks lend to each other, and is targeted by the Federal Reserve as its primary monetary policy tool. The TED Spread is the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate, and traditionally acts as an indicator of credit risk in the banking system (e.g., Cornett et al., 2011 ) .
Main results
Table 2 presents our first set of regression results. All independent variables are lagged one year to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns, as contemporaneous GDP cannot cause the lagged independent variables. We examine the effect of lagged LC per capita on GDP per capita for all banks using ordinary least squares (OLS). Regression (1) Across all specifications, the coefficient on lagged LC per capita is economically and statistically significant and positively related to GDP per capita . Using the coefficient from the full model in column (4), 105.0, we find that a one standard deviation increase in LC per capita is associated with an economically significant 2.57% increase in GDP per capita , evaluated at the sample mean level of $39,089.95. 11 The measured effect is similar across the other specifications. 12 Table 3 presents the results of our "horse races" between LC per capita and the two normalized measures of assets, TA per capita 11 We calculate economic impact by multiplying the standard deviation of lagged LC ($9.56) by its coefficient from the regression (105.0), and dividing by the sample mean of GDP per capita ($39,089.95). We follow a similar methodology throughout the paper.
12 With respect to the control variables, we also find that in all regressions, the coefficient on lagged State Income Tax is not significantly different from zero, while the coefficients on lagged State Minimum Wage, lagged State Government Expenditures per capita, and lagged Regional GDP per capita are all positive and significantly different from zero. We find that the coefficient on the Democratic Party Governor Dummy is not statistically different from zero. Additionally, we find that the coefficient on the Third Party Governor Dummy is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that relative to a Republican governor, a third party governor is associated with lower state GDP per capita. Further, we find that the State Legislature Dummy Variables are not statistically different from zero. These results are also robust to the exclusion of Time Fixed Effects and the inclusion of the lagged Federal Funds Rate and lagged TED Spread in regression (5). All variables maintain their signs and levels of significance from regression (4). Turning to the State Fixed Effects (not shown), the effects for Wyoming, Texas, Illinois, and Connecticut are appreciably larger than the omitted state, Alabama, while West Virginia, Mississippi, and Maine have fixed effects which suggest that their GDP per capita is much lower than Alabama. Examining the Time Fixed Effects (not shown), the crisis years, especially 2008 and 2009, have especially low GDP per capita relative to other years.
and GTA per capita . Regressions (1) and (2) include lagged TA per capita and GTA per capita , respectively, with control variables, but exclude lagged LC per capita . Regressions (3) and (4) run "horse races" between the lagged LC per capita and lagged TA per capita and lagged GTA per capita , respectively, inclusive of all the control variables. In regressions (1) and (2), we find that both TA per capita and GTA per capita are positively related to GDP per capita , but only the coefficient on TA per capita is statistically significant, and it is only significant at the 10% level, as opposed to the 1% level for LC per capita in the earlier tables. We further find in regressions (3) and (4) that lagged LC per capita outperforms the traditional measures of bank output in terms of forecasting GDP per capita . Neither lagged TA per capita nor lagged GTA per capita have statistically significant coefficients when LC per capita is included. Additionally, because their t-statistics are less than one, both variables reduce the model's Adjusted R 2 , meaning that their inclusion reduces the model's goodness of fit. In contrast, the coefficients on lagged LC per capita remain statistically significant and positive, while maintaining magnitudes similar to the previous regressions. A robustness check below suggests that the main reason for these results may be the inclusion of off-balance sheet activities in the LC measure, which are excluded by TA and GTA. Table 4 presents results which examine the effect of LC per capita on GDP per capita by bank size class. We split our sample of banks using a cutoff of 1 billion dollars in GTA. Banks less than or equal to $1 billion in assets are generally considered to be community banks ( DeYoung et al., 2004 ) and $1 billion is the traditional dividing line between small and large banks throughout much of the empirical banking literature (e.g., Carter and McNulty, 2005; Berger and Black, 2011 ) . We repeat the analysis from In both regressions, we find that the coefficients on LC per capita by both small and large banks are positive and statistically significant. Using the coefficient from regression (1) on small bank LC , 383.4, a one standard deviation shift in LC by small banks is associated with a 9.37% increase in GDP per capita over the sample mean level. For a similar increase, using the coefficient on large bank LC , 96.05, GDP per capita increases by 2.55% over the sample mean. These results may shed light on why banks are important to economic output. The banking literature generally suggests that small banks often provide relationship loans and commitments to small businesses that cannot be replicated by capital markets, and thus are better able to relieve small business financial constraints (e.g., Berger et al., 2005 ; . In contrast, large banks provide transactional credit to larger companies that are less bank dependent because they more often have outside capital market alternatives such as public debt and equity. Consistent with this, our data suggest that small bank LC may be more important to economic growth than large bank LC on a per-dollar basis. This is not the case on an outright basis, since large banks produce so many more dollars of LC. The coefficients on small bank LC per capita and large bank LC per capita are statistically different from each other at the 10% level in both regressions. The respective F-statistics for these tests are 3.41 and 3.12, with corresponding p-values of 0.0708 and 0.0838, and are shown near the bottom of the table. Finally, in both regressions, we find that the control variables behave in a manner consistent with earlier results. The potentially endogenous nature of our key exogenous variable, LC per capita , is also a concern. For example, banks may expand into or grow more in states with higher economic growth, and/or move out of or shrink in states with poor economic growth. Accordingly, we re-estimate our model using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. For completeness, we try different instruments. We use Bank Equity per capita , and the Rice-Strahan Index ( RSI ), which measures the restrictiveness of interstate branching regulations for the state in a particular year from 1994 until 2010.
The theories are split on the causal effects of our first instrument, equity, on bank liquidity creation. Some suggest that more bank capital may impede liquidity creation by making the bank less fragile (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 20 0 0 , 20 01 ). Fragile capital structures encourage banks to commit to monitoring their borrowers and off-balance sheet counterparties, and additional equity capital makes it harder for less-fragile banks to commit to monitoring, which in turn hampers their abilities to create liquidity. Capital may also reduce liquidity creation because it "crowds out" deposits, which are an important source of liquidity creation (e.g., Gorton and Winton, 2017 ) .
An alternative view is that higher capital improves banks' ability to absorb risk and hence their ability to create liquidity. Liquidity creation makes banks less liquid, exposing them to liquidity risk, raising the likelihood and severity of losses associated with having to dispose of illiquid assets or miss out on lending opportunities to meet customers' liquidity demands ( Allen and Santomero, 1997; Allen and Gale, 2004 ) . Capital absorbs risk and expands banks' risk-bearing capacity (e.g., Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Repullo, 2004; Von Thadden, 2004; Coval and Thakor, 2005 ) , so higher capital ratios may allow banks to create more liquidity. Donaldson et al., (2015) also show formally that higher capital can lead to more liquidity creation.
There is also evidence on the effects of capital on lending, a key component of liquidity creation. For example, studies of the banking crisis in the US in the early 1990s (also known as the "credit crunch") generally find that more capital is associated with higher lending and higher capital requirements are associated with reduced lending, suggesting that buffers over the regulatory minimums are needed for increased lending (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1994; Hancock et al., 1995; Peek and Rosengren, 1995a , b ; Shrieves and Dahl, 1995; Thakor, 1996 ) . Studies of other time periods and other nations seem to confirm these results, although the effects are often smaller (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 20 0 0; Calomiris and Wilson, 2004; Driscoll, 2004 ; Francis and Osborne, 2012 ; Berrospide and Edge, 2010; Aiyar et al., 2012; Jiménez et al., 2013 ) . Additionally, Berger and Bouwman (2009) find a positive relation between bank capital and liquidity creation for large banks and a negative relation for small banks using U.S. data from 1993-2003. At least part of this difference between small and large banks appears to be due to off-balance sheet activities. When they exclude off-balance sheet activities, the positive relation between capital and liquidity creation for large banks becomes statistically insignificant. Evidence from other countries generally find a negative relation for small banks and an insignificant effect for large banks, possibly because large banks in the other countries often do not have significant off-balance sheet activities (e.g., Fungacova et al., 2010; Fungacova and Weill, 2012; Lei and Song, 2013; Distinguin et al., 2013 ; Horváth et al., 2014 ) .
In our 2SLS analysis, we acknowledge the possible differences in the effects of Bank Equity between small and large banks, and include both Small Bank Equity and Large Bank Equity separately in some of the estimations as instruments for Lagged Small Bank LC and Lagged Large Bank LC .
Our other instrument is the Rice-Strahan Index, RSI , which measures the restrictiveness of the state's interstate branching regulations from 1994 to 2010. As discussed in Rice and Strahan (2010) , the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which opened up interstate branching for the first time since 1927, allowed individual states to continue to impose some restrictions on such branching. The index ranges from zero to four, and is the sum of four dummies for these restrictions: the minimum age of the institution for acquisition, allowance of de novo interstate branching, allowance of interstate branching by acquisition of a single branch or portions of an institution, and statewide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Since the index data from Rice and Strahan (2010) are only available for the period 1994-2005, we update these data using the 2002-2010 Profiles of State-Chartered Banking (PSCB) provided by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS). When we use RSI , we restrict the regressions to cover the data only since 1994 because there would be no variation in RSI prior to that time, since all interstate branching was essentially entirely banned (i.e., RSI would equal four for all of the earlier observations). Another limitation in using RSI is that we are not able to include time fixed effects because they are too highly related to the index -states simply do not change their restrictions much over time. We acknowledge that RSI may not be an ideal instrument. It may not be perfectly exogenous because state legislatures sometimes act on the behest of their states' banking industry ( Kroszner and Strahan, QJE 1999 ) . However, we do not believe that industry lobbying for this type of regulation is strongly related to industry liquidity creation.
We believe that our instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction. Bank capital and deregulation should affect economic growth almost exclusively through bank lending, off-balance sheet activities, deposits, and other banking activities that are all elements of bank liquidity creation. Thus, there is little way for bank capital or deregulation to affect economic growth outside of liquidity creation. (5) and (6) use RSI as the instrument.
We find in regressions (1) and (2) of Panel B that the coefficient on lagged LC per capita is positive and economically and statistically significant, and similar to the OLS findings. The coefficient of 116.7 in column (1) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in lagged bank LC per capita is related to a 2.85% increase in GDP per capita , consistent with our earlier results. The coefficient in column (2), 106.1, suggests a similar 2.60% increase in GDP per capita. (4) in Panel B have two instruments, and thus two first stages, which are presented in Panel A, columns (3a), (3b), (4a), and (4b). The dependent variable is state-level GDP per capita, and the instruments are bank equity per capita and the Rice-Strahan Index ( RSI ). The key independent variable, liquidity creation per capita, is liquidity creation (CATFAT) normalized by state population. The sample is split by bank size. Small banks are banks which have $1 billion in total assets or less. The sample period is 1984-2010 for regressions (1)- (4) and 1994-2010 for regressions (5) and (6), and z-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
* , * * , and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Both regressions (3) and (4) show that the coefficients on small and large bank LC per capita are economically and statistically significant and positive. The coefficients on lagged LC per capita for small and large banks are 724.1 and 111.7, respectively in regression (3). The 2SLS coefficients are larger than the OLS coefficients, a common finding in the literature (e.g., Levitt, 1996; . Using these coefficients, we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in small bank or large bank LC per capita is related to 17.71% and 2.73% increases over mean GDP levels, respectively, which are statistically different from each other at the 10% level. In all regressions, we estimate a Wald test for a weak instrument. In all specifications, the Wald statistic is larger than the critical value at the 10% level, 24.58, meaning we are able to reject the null hypothesis of a weak instrument. 13 Finally, in regressions (5) and (6), the coefficients on LC per capita are economically and statistically significant and positive, although they are much larger in magnitude than in the main 13 We also instrument for LC per Capita using a combination of Bank Equity per capita, the Rice-Strahan Index for bank deregulation, and dummy variables to represent Inter-and Intra-state banking deregulation. The Rice-Strahan Index represents the combination of several state-level bank regulatory powers (e.g. branching restrictions) to estimate the strength of bank regulation in each state ( Rice and Strahan, 2010 ) This specification takes advantage of changes in the regulatory environment, which would affect bank liquidity creation but not state-level GDP. Our results are robust to this alternative instrumentation. However, the model with all four instruments is overidentified. findings. We are again able to reject the null hypothesis of a weak instrument using the Wald test. The much greater magnitude for the coefficients on LC per capita may be due to the measurement issues discussed above -that we are restricted to data starting in 1994 and we are unable to include time fixed effects. 14 We also estimate our OLS regressions using an alternative functional form, substituting natural logarithms of GDP per capita and LC per Capita for their levels. Table 6 reports the results of these regressions. We find that our results are robust to this alternative specification. We further find that our 2SLS results are also robust to the use of natural logarithms for these key variables (not shown).
Panel
Additionally, develop both the CATFAT and CATNONFAT measures of LC , the first of which we use in our main regressions. CATFAT captures both on-and off-balance sheet LC , while CATNONFAT includes on-balance sheet LC only. Here, we use CATNONFAT for on-balance sheet LC and calculate (CATFAT -CATNONFAT) to measure off-balance sheet LC . In Table  7 , we first replicate the five regressions of Table 2 , but replace our LC per capita measure with on-balance sheet LC per capita and off-balance sheet LC per capita . We find that while both measures consistently have positive coefficients, only off-balance sheet LC per capita is statistically and economically significant. This result is Table 8 Test of reverse causality. This table presents Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results. The dependent variable is state-level LC per Capita . The key independent variable, GDP per capita , is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) normalized by state population. We also include lagged LC per Capita as a control variable, following the methodology of Granger (1969) . The sample period is 1984-2010, and t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
* , * * , and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Lag Length (n):
(1) consistent with the finding in Driscoll (2004) of no statistically significant effect of bank lending on state output. As discussed above, off-balance sheet guarantees like loan commitments and standby letters of credit, which make up most of off-balance sheet LC , allow customers to expand their economic activities because they are able to plan their investments and other expenditures (e.g., Boot et al., 1993 ) and act as back-ups for some capital market financing, such as commercial paper and municipal revenue bonds. Similarly, derivatives, allowing firms to grow by hedging market prices (e.g., Stulz, 2003 ) . Detrended off-balance sheet liquidity creation has also been found to better predict future financial crises better than on-balance sheet liquidity creation . This result may help explain why LC per capita beat TA per capita and GTA per capita in the "horse races" above -TA and GTA exclude off-balance sheet activities. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 7 show regressions with small bank and large bank on-balance sheet LC per capita and off-balance sheet LC per capita , with time fixed effects and the aggregate banking environment variables, respectively. The results show that for small banks, on-balance sheet LC per capita matters more and for large banks, off-balance sheet LC per capita matters more. This is likely because small banks tend to specialize in on-balance sheet activities and typically serve small businesses without significant outside financing options. In contrast, large banks generate most of their LC off the balance sheet and more often serve large businesses that have outside financing options, making on-balance sheet LC less important. Thus, while LC by both sizes of banks contribute significantly to economic growth, the primary mechanism behind these results differ -small banks contribute to economic growth primarily through on-balance sheet LC , while large banks add to economic growth chiefly through off-balance sheet LC . The reason why off-balance sheet LC per capita empirically dominates for the full sample is that large banks create so much more LC than small banks.
To further assuage endogeneity concerns, we test reverse causality, following the methodology of Granger (1969) . Note that Granger causality addresses predictability, and not economic causality. To this point in our analysis, we have studied the effect of lagged LC per capita on GDP per capita . Here, we run regressions of LC per capita on GDP per capita and LC per capita , both lagged one, two, three, or four years, and the control variables used in the full specification above. Table 8 presents the results. Across the four regressions, we do not find any evidence that GDP per capita Granger-causes LC per capita .
Financial crises, dynamics, and other robustness checks
We also investigate the effects of bank LC per capita during financial crises. Financial crises are often periods in which liquidity provided both by banks and by capital markets decline, so liquidity creation may be especially important during these times. The recent subprime crisis results may be particularly interesting, given that others find this crisis is related to a liquidity shock (e.g., Cornett et al., 2011; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Acharya and Mora, 2015; Gorton and Muir, 2015 ) .
To do this, we replicate Table 2 , but include interaction terms in which lagged LC per capita is multiplied by a dummy variable indicating whether a given year is a crisis year. We examine five distinct crisis periods, following Berger and Bouwman (2013) . 15 The crises include the 1987 stock market crash, the 1990-1992 Table 9 The effects of bank liquidity creation on GDP during financial crises. This credit crunch, the 1998 Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) episode and Russian debt crisis, the 20 0 0-20 02 dot-com bubble bursting and September 11 terrorist attacks, and the 20 07-20 09 subprime lending crisis. Table 9 presents our crisis regression results. Across all specifications, the coefficients on lagged LC per capita remain positive and statistically significant with economic magnitudes similar to our main results, suggesting that our findings hold during normal times. The interaction term for each crisis measures the deviation from the normal times effect for that crisis and the sum of the coefficient on LC per capita plus the coefficient on the interaction term with the dummy for each crisis measures the estimated effect for that crisis. The coefficients on the crisis interaction terms are generally different from one another, with the first two generally negative and the last three generally positive, suggesting that there is no uniform crisis effect. The total effects for the first two crises are generally close to zero or negative, while the last three suggest stronger effects during these crises than during normal times, but the differences are often not statistically significant. Thus, LC per capita appears to have statistically and economically significant effects on GDP per capita during normal times and may be accentuated during the last three crises, but was not effective during the first two crises.
We next analyze the dynamics of the relation by including two-, three-, and four-year lagged LC per capita variables along with the one-year lagged value. We estimate regressions which include each lagged value separately, and finally a regression which includes all four lags. These results are reported in Table  10 . Using one lag at a time in regressions (1)-(4) with the Year fixed effects, and (6)- (9) with the aggregate banking environment variables, we find that the coefficients on one-, two-, three-, and four-year lagged LC per capita are independently positive and statistically significant. When all lagged LC variables are combined in regressions (5) and (10), we find that only the coefficients on the one-year lagged LC per capita are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the effects of LC are relatively short-lived. The positive effects of the longer lags in regressions (1)- (4) and (6)- (9) likely reflect high collinearity with the first lag, given that the correlations with the first lag are all over 71%. These results suggest that most of the effects of LC per capita on GDP per capita occur during the first year.
We run a number of additional robustness tests. We first investigate whether our results are driven by our method of allocating LC proportionally based on the deposits in branches of multistate banks. We drop all multistate banks from our sample and repeat our analysis for only single-state banks. Table 11 presents the outcome of these tests. We find that these results do not differ from our earlier findings that (1) LC is positive related to GDP , (2) LC outperforms TA per capita and GTA per capita in "horse races," (3) that Small Bank LC per Capita has a stronger effect per dollar Table 10 The dynamic effects of bank liquidity creation on GDP. This table presents Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results. The dependent variable is state-level GDP per Capita . The key independent variable, LC per Capita , is liquidity creation (CATFAT) normalized by state population. We also include the two-, three-, and four-year lagged LC per Capita . The sample is split by bank size. Small banks are banks which have less than or equal to $1 billion in gross total assets. The sample period is 1984-2010, and t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses.
* , * * , and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) We conduct six more robustness checks that we do not show in the tables. First, we test for a quadratic relation between LC per capita and GDP per capita . We find that a squared LC per capita term is negative, but not statistically significant. Second, we try including lagged GDP per capita on the right-hand-side of the GDP per capita regressions and find that the main results continue to hold. Third, we try regressing the annual change in GDP per capita on the change in LC per capita plus the control variables, and find that a similar relation holds. Fourth, we replicate results using standard errors clustered by both state and year, and find our results to be robust. Fifth, we estimate regressions for subsamples of states based on their prior economic conditions. We split our sample each year using the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's Coincident Index 16 and (separately) GDP growth in the previous year. Regardless of the subsample, we find that LC per capita is statistically significant and economically meaningful. However, we find that the economic magnitude of LC per capita 's effect on GDP per capita is greater for states with an above-median Coincident Index or above-median GDP growth in the previous year. Sixth, we repeat our analysis omitting Delaware and South Dakota because of the reporting irregularities described above and find that our results continue to hold.
Industry-level results
We finally study the effect of state-level LC per Capita on stateindustry-level GDP per capita . As discussed above, we hypothesize that the main transmission mechanism through which bank LC affects GDP is through increased output of firms in bank-dependent industries. Industries with better access to capital markets are less likely to be affected by bank LC . This is suggested by results in Rajan and Zingales (1998) , who find that firms in manufacturingbased industries which are more dependent on external financing grow faster in countries with developed financial systems.
We obtain GDP data by industry at the state level from the BEA. The industries are based on the BEA's North American In-dustry Classification System (NAICS) from 1997-2010. We do not use identical industry classifications to those of Rajan and Zingales (1998) , as they limit their analysis to manufacturing-based industries, whereas we include all industries in our sample. We are unable to include the data before 1997, as they are based on the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system, which is not consistent with NAICS classifications. 17 Table 12 presents the results of our industry-level study. We run the regressions for each industry and present only the coefficients and t-statistics for LC per capita . We include but do not show all of the controls from our full specification in Table 2 , as well as state and year fixed effects. The dependent variable in each regression is the state-industry-level GDP per capita . Our findings show that the coefficient on LC per capita is positively related to GDP per capita for all industries except health care and "other services," suggesting that the effects of LC on real economic growth are widespread. However, this relation is not statistically significant for all industries. We find that output in bank-dependent industries like mining, construction, and manufacturing is strongly influenced by bank liquidity creation. Alternatively, we find that the GDP per capita of industries which are less bank-dependent, such as the government and health care, are not positively influenced by LC per capita. Our state-industry-level results give us more confidence in our main result that LC is positively related to real economic growth.
Conclusion
This paper studies the relation between bank liquidity creation ( LC) and economic output ( GDP ). We find that state LC per capita is positively related to real economic output in terms of state GDP per capita , and that the results are both statistically and economically significant. Moreover, we find that small bank LC generates more GDP per dollar than large bank LC , but large bank LC matters more overall because large banks provide much more LC than small banks. We also find that for small banks, on-balance sheet LC per capita matters more and for large banks, off-balance sheet LC per capita matters more. Thus, while LC by both sizes of banks con-tribute significantly to economic growth, the primary mechanism behind these results differ -on-balance sheet LC by small banks and off-balance sheet LC by large banks. We also study this relation during normal times and financial crises, and find mixed results. We also study the dynamics of the relation, and find that the effects of LC per capita are strongest in the first year. Finally, we find that the LC -output relation is strongest in bank-dependent industries, consistent with the hypothesized transmission mechanism.
Our paper also sheds light on the use of LC as a measure of bank output. When compared to traditional measures of bank output, total assets ( TA ) and gross total assets ( GTA ), we find that LC is a statistically and economically significant determinant of GDP per capita , while TA per capita and GTA per capita are not, suggesting that LC may be a superior measure of bank output. This may be because LC takes into account off-balance sheet activities, liabilities, and capital, as well as assets, and/or because it weights different assets differently.
This study also has important policy implications. Policymakers might want to encourage liquidity creation within a robust banking sector, as this may lead to higher levels of economic output. However, there may be an optimal point for liquidity creation. From a microprudential perspective, excessive liquidity creation may cause liquidity risk within individual institutions. From a macroprudential perspective, excessive liquidity creation may also cause result in asset bubbles that burst and cause financial crises ( Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; . Thus, policymakers face a trade-off between economic growth on the one hand and individual institution and financial system stability on the other hand. Current regulations may discourage liquidity creation. The Basel III Accord includes liquidity ratios which discourage banks from creating liquidity, as banks are required to hold more liquid assets such as marketable securities and are discouraged from holding illiquid loans and liquid deposits (e.g., Grind et al., 2014 ) . However, the Basel III ratios are generally not very highly correlated with the LC/GTA ratio, so that Basel III liquidity requirements may not have a very large effect on bank liquidity creation ( Berger and Bouwman, 2016 ) . Further, higher required bank capital ratios may either encourage or discourage liquidity creation within banks depending upon which of the theoretical concepts empirically dominates, which is not clear from the literature. This paper also has implications for future research. While we find that bank liquidity creation impacts economic growth -primarily through on-balance sheet LC for small banks and primarily through off-balance sheet LC for large banks -more research is needed on the underlying mechanisms or channels through which it occurs. Finally, more research on the effects of bank capital ratios on liquidity creation is needed to clarify which of the theoretical effects dominate under different circumstances.
